

WAR VOTING: INTERSTATE DISPUTES, THE ECONOMY, AND ELECTORAL OUTCOMES

Additional Materials

This appendix provides empirical analyses that are discussed—but not presented—in “War Voting: Interstate Disputes, the Economy, and Electoral Outcomes”. Table A1 summarizes analyses in which we either use different estimation procedures or include relevant control variables. In Models A1 and A2, we re-estimate Model 2 in Table 1 with panel-corrected standard errors. We include all government parties in our sample, which includes both single-party and coalition governments. Coalition governments pose two special modeling concerns. First, there is the possibility that the errors are correlated not across time but across the spatial unit (in this case, election). Stochastic events that influence governing party vote share (such as scandals and valence issues) are likely to influence all of the governing parties, which implies that our model will under- or over-predict the coalition parties similarly. Second, coalition parties may be unable to experience the large gains and losses that single-party governments have. This suggests that the error variance may be larger for single-party governments relative to coalition governments. Estimating panel-corrected standard errors corrects for both spatially-correlated errors and panel heteroskedasticity (Beck and Katz 1995). In Model A1, we control for the executive party by including a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if the party holds the executive portfolio. Model A2 excludes this control. The results and the marginal effects figure shown in Figures A1 and A2, are consistent with our previous findings.

Model A3 adds *time left in constitutional inter-election period* (CIEP). Most parliamentary democracies give the prime minister (or head of state) the power to dissolve parliament and call for early elections (Strom and Swindle 2002). This is a powerful tool for the government, and has been shown to produce more beneficial outcomes for government parties (Palmer and Whitten 2000). Moreover, the electoral cycle has been shown to influence conflict propensity. Gaubatz (1991) suggests that executives initiate more wars immediately following elections, and then behave less aggressively as the next election approaches. Thus, there is the possibility that the electoral cycle is causing a spurious association between our theoretical variables. Only one of our states in the sample has a fixed election cycle (U.S.), so we include a variable that measures the time until the next constitutionally-mandated election has to occur (Kurian 1997). This is a variable that accurately captures the election cycle for both fixed and flexible election timing. The results shown in Model A3 and the marginal effects shown in Figure A3 suggest that our findings are robust (albeit at a lower level of statistical significance than 95%) even after incorporating the election cycle.

Model A4 simply excludes the U.S. from the sample. Given the large literatures on the U.S. presidential use of force as well as the literatures on presidential approval and elections in the U.S., we wanted to demonstrate that the results obtained here were not driven by the U.S. alone. Figure A4 shows the marginal effects of disputes with changes in GDP. Again, these results are not substantively different from those presented in the paper.

Model A5 accounts for all hostility levels of MIDs. In the paper, we consider the conditional effect of only forceful (hostility levels 4 and 5) MIDs. Given that MIDs

should be visible in order to affect the choices of individual voters, this is not an unreasonable coding choice. However, we can have greater confidence in our findings if a similar relationship is borne out when considering the conditional relationship between all hostility levels of MIDs. Figure A5 shows the marginal effects of all levels of MIDs. Although somewhat diminished, the results remain consistent with those reported in the paper.


Models A6 and A7 distinguish between minor and major powers, respectively. We make this distinction to control for the varying propensity among our sample states to become involved in disputes, as well as the subsequent influence of those disputes on electoral outcomes. For example, voters may see dispute involvement by weaker states to be a function of alliance commitments with the major powers, and therefore may demand less accountability from the governing parties. Model A6 includes only minor powers, while Model 7 includes only major powers' elections. Figure A6 shows the marginal effects of disputes among minor powers while Figure A7 shows that for major powers. Though the statistical significance of both marginal effects is reduced due to the smaller sample size, the direction of the interactive relationship—as well as marginal effects—is consistent with those shown in the paper.

Table A1. The Economy, Disputes, and Government Parties' Vote Share: Robustness Checks

	Model A1	Model A2	Model A3	Model A4	Model A5	Model A6	Model A7
GDP	.065 (.272)	.026 (.269)	.451* (.305)	.156 (.325)	.184 (.327)	.367 (.330)	-.476 (.704)
Disputes	-5.77*** (2.14)	-5.849** (2.31)	-3.862*** (2.06)	-5.763*** (2.304)	-1.403* (1.12)	-4.201* (2.908)	-6.936** (3.236)
GDP × Disputes	1.245*** (.456)	1.20** (.487)	0.596 (.504)	.656 (.717)	.441** (.257)	.249 (.813)	1.409** (.760)
Lag of Vote Share	.769*** (.070)	.905*** (.025)	.765*** (.077)	.739*** (.083)	.733*** (.082)	.739*** (.089)	.408** (.233)
Executive Party	4.858** (2.33)		5.636*** (2.195)				
Time Left in CIEP			.151*** (.047)				
Constant	1.991 (1.514)	1.049 (1.285)	-.984 (2.122)	1.906 (1.951)	1.299 (2.088)	.232 (1.942)	20.907** (8.160)
Observations	123	123	123	113	123	92	31
R^2 within			.81	.80	.78	.85	.33
R^2 between			.91	.96	.96	.97	.99
R^2 overall	.86	.86	.86	.85	.86	.88	.75


Note: One-tailed significance tests: *: p-value < 0.10, **: p-value < 0.05, ***: p-value < 0.01

Figure A1. Marginal Effect of Dispute Involvement on Governing Party Vote Share Conditional on Economic Growth: Cluster on Elections with Control for Executive (Model A1)




Note: dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals

Figure A2. Marginal Effect of Dispute Involvement on Governing Party Vote Share Conditional on Economic Growth: Cluster on Elections without Control for Executive (Model A2)




Note: dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals

Figure A3. Marginal Effect of Dispute Involvement on Governing Party Vote Share Conditional on Economic Growth: Controlling for CIEP – Proximity of Elections – (Model A3)




Note: dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals

Figure A4. Marginal Effect of Dispute Involvement on Governing Party Vote Share
Conditional on Economic Growth: U.S. excluded (Model A4)




Note: dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals

Figure A5. Marginal Effect of Dispute Involvement on Governing Party Vote Share
Conditional on Economic Growth: All MID Hostility Levels (Model A5)




Note: dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals

Figure A6. Marginal Effect of Dispute Involvement on Governing Party Vote Share
Conditional on Economic Growth: Minor Powers Only (Model A6)



Note: dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals

Figure A7. Marginal Effect of Dispute Involvement on Governing Party Vote Share
Conditional on Economic Growth: Major Powers Only (Model A7)



Note: dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals

References (Not Referenced in Manuscript)

Beck, Nathaniel and Jonathan N. Katz. 1995. "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data." *American Political Science Review* 89: 634-647.

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